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The concept of capacity that emerges from the Mental Capacity Act (2005) is 
conceptually flawed and places practitioners in an impossible situation regarding its 
application. The continued support by the UK government and others for the Act 
strengthens the idea that the capacity/incapacity distinction is natural and that 
incapacity is an intrapsychic feature of an individual. This paper proposes an 
alternative model for understanding capacity and its assessment based on a narrative 
theory that recognises the role of the practitioner and identity negotiation. Although 
this more nuanced approach may at first appear more complex, it avoids the 
conceptual and practical difficulties raised by the notion of mental capacity.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) established a legal framework for the 
identification and classification of human action as either capacitous or incapacitous. 
This framework however can be understood in a broader context, as part of a 
movement in health and social care for greater protection of those experiencing 
vulnerability, whilst also empowering individuals to act with self-determination.1 In 
outlining the conditions under which an individual’s actions are to be respected but 
also under which interference is permitted, the MCA attempts to distinguish between 
autonomous and non-autonomous action. Where an individual is found to have 
capacity, they are permitted to have their actions respected and as such mental 
capacity is “gatekeeper to the right to autonomy”.2 The definition of capacity adopted 
in the MCA, the culmination of a lengthy deliberation, is but one of many definitions 
which could have underpinned capacity legislation. Although the Act has received 
political praise and support, at both its coming into law and by a House of Lords Select 
Committee in 2014, the argument can be made that for such a rigorously debated 
piece of legislation, considerable difficulties remain. The difficulty of achieving 
compliance or implementation is compounded by the non-binding status of the Code 
of Practice and the lack of a definitive guide for compliance with the MCA.3 The 
recommendation that greater effort needs to be placed on achieving compliance has 
beckoned in considerable emphasis on training. The issue of implementation is itself 
subject to a more serious concern, namely whether it is possible to achieve what the 
Act sets out in the first place. The allocation of considerable financial resources to 
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1 It is this political and social agenda associated with the MCA that is considered “ground breaking”, see 
T Williamson, ‘Capacity to Protect – the Mental Capacity Act explained’ (2007) 9(1) Journal of Adult 
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Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010) 2. 
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training and implementation would appear questionable at the least, if it is unclear 
whether a capacity assessment in accordance with the Act can be performed.  
 
The MCA arguably can be read as adopting a Millian understanding of the liberal self, 
inviting capacity to be considered in regard to liberty and non-interference.4 The 
presence of capacity prohibits interference in an individual’s action. The establishment 
in the MCA of a cognitivist two-stage assessment process for the identification of 
incapacity in respect of a decision at a specific time, places constraints on the attempt 
to justify interference in the life of another. The two-stage process is comprised of 
diagnostic and functional elements. For an individual to be found to lack capacity they 
must have an “impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” 
which leads to an inability to “understand the information relevant to a decision”, “to 
retain this information”, to use or weigh this information”, and to “communicate his 
decision” or simply understanding, retention, weighing and communication (URWC).5 
Where assessment is called for, individuals with impairments of the mind or brain must 
demonstrate all four abilities in respect of a proposed decision to be held capacitous. 
As Catriona Mackenzie and Wendy Rogers observe however, the expectation of the 
MCA for mental capacity to be assessed at a specific time, (synchronically), is 
challenged by the parallel commitment to understand the self and consequently mental 
capacity over time, (diachronically).6 In section 1 the principles for the application of 
the Act are set out.  Principle 3 of the MCA requires that a person be engaged with 
over time and supported in making a decision, while in respect of best interests 
determinations in section 4(6) there is a requirement to consider the individual over 
time so that a best interests decision is founded on an appreciation of the individual’s 
values, beliefs, etc. Further challenges to the MCA’s understanding of the self 
cognitively and discretely are advanced in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and in approaches which view the MCA in 
a broader context of care and the promotion of self-determination.7 The tension in the 
MCA between viewing the self cognitively at a specific time and viewing the self as 
having values and beliefs through time, coupled with the acknowledgment that 
capacity assessments consider an individual over time, suggest that incapacity is not 
located within an individual simply at a specific time.8 The MCA can be read as relying 
on particular conceptions or philosophies of the self, some of which are inconsistent 
with each other, the demands of practice and other legal frameworks including the 
UNCRPD.9  
 
The adoption of a narrative approach to selfhood allows for an interrogation of mental 
capacity practice and highlights inadequacies and limitations in the cognitivist 
                                            
4 JS Mill, On Liberty and other writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 13. 
5 Department of Health. Mental Capacity Act. (HMSO, London 2005) Part 1, Section 2(1) & 3(1).  
6 C Mackenzie and W Rogers, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability and Capacity: a philosophical appraisal of the 
Mental Capacity Act’ (2013) 9 (Special Issue 1) International Journal of Law in Context 37-52. 
7 See P Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental 
Health Law’ (2012) 75(5) Modern Law Review 752-778; Gerard Quinn. “Personhood and Legal 
Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article 12 CRPD.” Paper presented at HPOD 
Conference, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA, 20 February 2010.  
8 S Stefan, ‘Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law’ (1993) 47 U. Miami 
Law Review, 766 and Donnelly, above, n 2, 147. 
9 This paper does not seek to address the compatibility between the MCA and UNCRPD. For such a 
discussion see L Series, ‘Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and Support 
Paradigms’ (2015) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80-91.  
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approach of the MCA. Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative identity, as developed 
in Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another, allows for mental capacity practice to 
be evaluated from a perspective distinct from both the cognitive model of the MCA and 
recent relational approaches to mental capacity.10 Ricoeur argues that the activity of 
narrative identity, as something we engage in alongside others, is that which provides 
integrity or coherence to people’s lives by drawing together different aspects of 
experience.11 Crucially though, narrative is inter-subjective and can thus be seen as 
posing a challenge to the individualistic understanding of the self espoused in the 
MCA. The problems associated with implementing the MCA including instigating 
capacity assessment, assessing functional understanding, assessor bias and in 
particular the call for understanding capacity as internal to an individual and the 
requirement to view the self both diachronically and synchronically, places a burden 
and seemingly impossible expectation on practitioners. The narrative interpretation 
defended here makes two claims. First, capacity assessment can be considered as a 
mimetic activity and second, capacity assessment is a site of identity negotiation. This 
challenges the notion that capacity assessment is strictly about the individual 
assessed but calls for recognition of the social context and identity of the assessor 
and questions the idea that capacity is a claim about an individual.  This narrative 
reading of mental capacity, comprised of mimetic and identity negotiation claims, 
challenges the coherence of the MCA’s cognitivist approach. The practice of 
conferring capacity or incapacity is not defended or critiqued here, rather a narrative 
approach is proposed as providing a more accurate description of practices in capacity 
assessment. In highlighting the inadequacies of the MCA’s approach, a narrative 
approach problematizes the instigation of capacity assessment, the nature of what is 
assessed and the conception that capacity is time-specific. Although this approach 
adds a complexity to understanding the assessment process, it identifies practical and 
conceptual difficulties and as such provides a more coherent account of practice.  
 
In Part II a narrative approach to selfhood is developed from a reading of Paul Ricoeur 
and linked to the work of Marya Schechtman and Hilde Lindemann. Part III begins with 
a brief overview of difficulties in the application of the MCA. In Part III.1 four ways in 
which narrative identity can be applied to mental capacity practice are identified. In 
section III.2 a mimetic account of assessment is developed. The challenges such an 
approach poses to the functional model of the MCA are outlined in III.3. In Part IV the 
second claim of the narrative approach is proposed, namely that mental capacity 
assessment involves identity negotiation for at least two people. Finally, in Part V the 
narrative identity theory of mental capacity is set out and its relation to the functional 
model of capacity developed.   
 
                                            
10 Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative identity is developed across multiple works. See P Ricoeur, 
Time and Narrative Vol. I, II, III, (K Mclaughlin and Pellauer tr, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1984, 1985, 1988) & P Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, (K Blamey tr, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1992).   
11 P Ricoeur, ‘Life in Quest of Narrative’ in D Wood (eds), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, 
(Routledge, London: 1991). 
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II. NARRATIVE SELFHOOD 
The opportunity to understand the self and selfhood outside of a liberal conception of 
the self is offered by vulnerability12 and relational approaches.13 In drawing attention 
to the role of others and context, purely internal approaches to understanding the self 
are challenged. Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative identity echoes this concern 
with how the self is viewed and can be read as offering an alternative to internal 
accounts of the self. A reading of Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative leaves some 
ambiguity as to how narrative identity is negotiated. Schechtman’s conception of 
narrative self-constitution and Lindemann’s account of the relational practice of identity 
negotiation it is proposed here complement Ricoeur’s understanding and provide 
additional support for the application of a narrative approach to mental capacity.  In 
Part III, mental capacity assessment is considered through the lens of narrative 
identity.  
 
In Time and Narrative (TN) Ricoeur develops his most detailed account of the function 
of narrative and crucially the mechanics of narrative practice. The practice of narrative, 
whether fictive, historical or personal, has as its theme time or the “temporal character 
of human experience”.14 It is the mediating function of narrative that allows temporality 
to be accessible to consideration. The activity of narrative attempts to but does not 
resolve the “paradoxical nature of time”.15 The first problem is the conflict between 
phenomenological and cosmological time, or between lived and objective time. The 
second problem is the dissociation or distention caused by the past, present and future 
in awareness that “the future is not yet, the past is no longer, and the present does not 
remain”.16 The third problem is the ‘inscrutability’ of time, that for all the efforts of 
narrative, time evades constitution. In Ricoeur’s later works on narrative, the focus is 
on the primacy of narrative identity for lived experience, the function narrative identity 
plays in synthesizing two aspects of selfhood and an understanding of the relation 
between selfhood, narrative and narrative identity.   
 
In Book One of TN, Ricoeur introduces his threefold understanding of mimesis as the 
process through which time becomes refigured and productive. Whereas the action of 
telling a story is often associated with narrative, Ricoeur develops a broader approach. 
Mimesis1, as the first stage of narrative corresponds to the preconditions for any act 
of narrative emplotment. Before an individual can narrate their identity there must be 
in play a “pre-understanding of the world of action”, comprised of structural, symbolic 
and temporal dimensions.17 An individual must be versed in the “conceptual network” 
through which action can be talked about, understand that action is symbolically 
                                            
12 See F Luna, Bioethics and Vulnerability: A Latin American View (Rodopi, New York 2006) and C 
Mackenzie, W Rogers and S Dodds, (2014) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist 
Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, New York 2014). 
13 See C Kong, Mental Capacity in Relationship: Decision-Making, Dialogue and Autonomy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2017); B Clough, ‘Vulnerability and Capacity to Consent to Sex- Asking 
the Right Questions?’ (2015) 26(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly, 371-397; C Mackenzie and N 
Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, (Oxford 
University Press, New York 2000). 
14 P Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol. I (K Mclaughlin and Pellauer tr, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1984), 3.  
15 D Wood, ‘Introduction: Interpreting Narrative’ in D Wood (eds), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
Interpretation, (Routledge, London: 1991) 1. 
16 Ricoeur, above, n 14, 7. 
17 ibid, 54.  
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articulated and appreciate the temporal aspects of experience which are considered 
to require a narrative response.18 Mimesis2  refers to the stage of emplotting an 
account of action and serves to synthesise events and occurrences and impose a 
configurational order on to events. As a cultural practice, narrating is governed by a 
tradition of available schemas through which one can create a narrative account. 
Finally, Mimesis3 refers to the final stage where the proposed narrative is brought to 
the world. It is only at this stage of “application”, that narratives become complete.19 
At this stage the text or narrative of the author intersects with the “world of the hearer 
or reader”.20 The narrative proposed projects a particular horizon or understanding of 
the world.   
 
Ricoeur's later discussions of narrative identity can be read as complementary to the 
exposition of the mimetic function and its relation to time. In ‘Life in Quest of Narrative’, 
narratives are considered to address three relations; man’s relationship with the world, 
others and himself.21 Narrative identity corresponds to the third and as such is self-
understanding. It is in the activity of interpreting one’s experiences through narrative 
that human existence becomes lived. Life becomes meaningful and life itself through 
the activity of telling stories about it. Although narrative identity relates to self-
understanding, Ricoeur is not suggesting that it is a distinctly first personal or private 
activity.  
 
In two chapters of Oneself as Another Ricoeur advances an understanding of narrative 
identity as a response to difficulties in personal identity debates. Ricoeur proposes two 
poles of identity: “identity as sameness (idem)” and “identity as selfhood (ipse)”.22 The 
traditional approach to personal identity seeks to look for that which provides continuity 
through time or that which remains the same and allows for identity over time to be 
observed. The focus on identity as sameness at the expense of selfhood fails to 
appreciate the activities persons alongside others engage in to negotiate and maintain 
identities. Identity as selfhood corresponds to two aspects which allow for persons to 
persist through time. Selfhood as character refers to “the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized”.23 Selfhood as ‘keeping one’s word’ designates the 
activity of self constancy in the face of change. It refers to the who of identity. Between 
these two, the sameness of character by which individuals are recognised and the 
selfhood of keeping one’s word lies an interval in which narrative identity operates. It 
serves to unify both the way in which the self and others view the self as having a 
character, and the activities of selfhood through time.   
 
In telling stories or offering narratives, individuals plot accounts that involve the identity 
of characters including their own character. Narrative provides a space where 
individuals talk about their character in the midst of action. In talking about one’s own 
character alongside events and other characters, the narrator imposes an imaginative 
account which seeks to bring a unity or coherence to their life. The activity of narrative 
identity acts to blur the lines between “author, narrator and character” and at times 
                                            
18 ibid, 55. 
19 ibid, 70. 
20 ibid, 71. 
21 Ricoeur, above, n 11, 27.  
22 Ricoeur,1992, above, n 10, 116.  
23 ibid, 121. 
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one is all three.24 However, as the ability to narrate is governed by tradition and the 
culture one inhabits offers ways of narrating, Ricoeur argues that at best one should 
be considered a co-author of their own narratives.   
 
Narrative selfhood refers then to the narrative activity that selves are involved in as 
they seek self-understanding through the interpretation of experience and in doing so 
draw together identity as selfhood and sameness. Although Ricoeur fails to address 
the mimetic component of personal identity in his later writing it is evident from Part IV 
of TN that he intended narrative identity (both community and personal) to be read 
through a mimetic lens. In Part III of TN Ricoeur claims that fictional and historical 
narratives are preceded by a use of narrative in daily life. As co-authors, individuals 
are not just engaged by narrative selfhood in their own self-understanding but act as 
members of the culture that offer available narratives to others and provide critical 
readership of other’s narrative accounts. This approach to narrative selfhood allows 
for a distinction between individuals, narratives and narrative identities. Individuals 
exist within cultures with traditions of understanding and ways to make sense of 
personal experience. Alongside others, individuals tell stories or offer narrative 
accounts which project particular interpretations of their own character, their world and 
relationships for readership. However, others are implicated in this process as both 
those who offer narrative schemas but also those who read their narratives. 
Furthermore, individual’s narratives must include not just their own selfhood but also 
their sameness, which involves both how others and they see and identify themselves. 
Narrative identity refers to that which acts to bring together the two poles of one’s 
identity and can be considered to include varying narratives which are continually 
being negotiated. The practice of narrative selfhood can be considered self-
constituting, as it is through this activity that an attempt to make sense of one’s self is 
performed, which can then go on to inform how both the individual and others 
understand the individual.  
 
Although a critical examination of Ricoeur’s account is not the aim of this paper, it is 
important to acknowledge that debates concerning the role of narrative as it relates to 
the self are common.25 Ricoeur’s work can be considered alongside others as calling 
for the primacy of narrative in understanding the self which itself is subject to sustained 
debate in philosophy and the medical humanities. Bringing the discussion back to 
personal narrative identity, further questions remain. At what point might it be 
appropriate to say an individual is engaged in narrative identity or narrative selfhood? 
This work proposes that the practice of mental capacity assessment can be 
understood through the language of mimesis and more generally as an activity of 
mimesis3, the stage of critical readership. At the point of application, where the 
proposed narrative meets the world, the basis on which narratives are accepted or 
rejected requires clarification. It is proposed here that Marya Schechtman’s The 
Constitution of Selves and Hilde Lindemann’s Holding and Letting Go complement 
Ricoeur’s understanding of the act of critical readership.26 Three questions can be 
                                            
24 ibid, 159. 
25 See J McCarthy, Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self, (Humanity Books, New York 2007), 230-
231; G Strawson, ‘Against Narrativity’ (2004) 4 Ratio 428-452; A Woods, ‘Post-narrative – An Appeal’ 
(2011) 2 Narrative Inquiry 399-406. 
26 See M Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1996) and H 
Lindemann, Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practice of Personal Identity, (Oxford University Press, 
New York 2014). 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
55 
 
raised about this critical stage of readership. Who gets to perform critical readership 
of another’s narratives and narrative identity? When do personal narratives and 
narrative identity receive critical readership? What are the criteria with which personal 
narratives and narrative identity are evaluated?  
 
The act of mental capacity assessment it is argued here can be considered to engage 
with the first and second question. This is not to suggest that mental capacity 
assessment is the only site of critical readership or that assessors are the only persons 
permitted to assess narrative identity.  Echoing Ricoeur, Schechtman proposes a 
narrative self-constitution view which affords central importance to others. While 
narrative self-conceptions can be considered personal, Schechtman observes that 
individuals must comply with “The Articulation Constraint” and “The Reality 
Constraint”.27 This suggests that narrative accounts at times are required to be 
articulated and where this is not provided there is scope for one’s narrative identity to 
be questioned. A further constraint on the content of narratives is that they must 
comply with norms concerning narrative construction. Narratives must not violate clear 
facts about the world or be guilty of interpretive inaccuracies. Lindemann further 
complements this notion of identity being subject to critical readership in developing 
an account of the process of holding and letting go. Central to the development of 
identity, itself a process of personhood, is the importance of recognition by others. 
Lindemann argues that the performance of identity is itself a regulated behaviour 
wherein others can have four grounds on which identity can be denied. These are 
“malfunctioning mental states”, “misleading expressions”, “misfiring recognition” and 
“misshapen response”.28   
 
In the remainder of this paper, Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity, narrative selfhood, 
mimesis and identity negotiation are applied to the practice of mental capacity 
assessment. The approaches of Ricoeur, Schechtman and Lindemann offer a 
vocabulary which allows for a new description of what happens in mental capacity 
assessment.  
 
III. CAPACITY ASSESSMENTS AND NARRATIVE IDENTITY 
 
The uptake of a two-stage diagnostic and functional approach to assessing capacity 
in the MCA is drawn from the Law Commission’s examination of different approaches 
to mental capacity.29 The Act requires that for a person to be found to lack capacity 
they must be ‘unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because 
of an impairment, or a disturbance in the function of the mind or brain’. The inclusion 
of a diagnostic threshold serves to forbid the use of capacity legislation to interfere in 
the lives of those without a disability. The two-stage approach establishes the need 
for a causal nexus between the inability and the impairment to be identified for a finding 
of incapacity. The two-stage approach gives rise to two interpretations about the order 
in which assessment takes place. On one reading of Section 2(1), the functional ability 
to make a decision is the primary concern and when lacking it becomes appropriate 
to assess whether it is caused by an impairment. An alternative reading is to follow the 
structure of the Act whereby the diagnostic threshold is first considered (Section 2) 
                                            
27 Schechtman, above, n 26, 114- 121. 
28 Lindemann, above, n 26, 106-117.  
29 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction (Law Com 
No 128, Consultation Paper No. 128, 1992), 22.  
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and when an impairment is present then an assessment of functional capacity (Section 
3) is to be undertaken. The adoption of either approach to stages of capacity 
assessment however fails to clarify what triggers or instigates a capacity assessment. 
Unless all healthcare decisions are assessed through a diagnosis and then function 
approach or vice versa, then a justification for the initial decision to assess capacity in 
respect of some decision is required.  
 
The functional model of capacity endorsed in the MCA constitutes decision making 
ability as composed of four abilities: understanding, retaining of information, use or 
weighing of information and communication. The first requirement holds that decision 
makers must have the ability to understand information relevant to the decision.30 The 
second requirement that persons retain information introduces complexity in relation 
to duration in two regards. Firstly, where a person lacks the time to retain information 
or that ability is inconsistent, then the notion of fluctuating capacity is considered to 
arise. The second issue relates to the duration of decisions to be made and the 
relevance of retention of information if capacity is always decision specific.31 Where a 
decision involves a duration such as where a person should live or whether to force 
feed a patient for a period of time, the role of retention of information concerns the 
decision making itself. The third requirement that persons use or weigh information 
expects decision makers not just to understand information but to be able to reflexively 
appropriate and endorse the decision.32 The fourth component of communication is a 
residual requirement that speaks to situations where an individual is incapable of 
communication which prevents judgement on the other three abilities.33 Although the 
decision maker is required to demonstrate the functional abilities, they are entitled to 
support in respect of each ability as the second guiding principle of the Act requires 
that “all practicable steps be taken to help the person in making the decision”.34 These 
abilities correspond to the internal requirements the decision maker must demonstrate 
but the decision itself must be already identified as a matter which must be decided 
upon. Although this paper is unable to explore this question, the issue of the 
appropriateness of decisions put to persons seems central to discussion of capacity.  
 
The implementation of the MCA, the move from theory to practice, can be considered 
both in regard to what practice is performed in its name but also what practice the 
MCA actually calls for. The application of the MCA is guided somewhat by the Code 
of Practice; however, it is non-binding. Critical discussions of the first four sections of 
the Act reveal several challenges facing would-be assessors of capacity. As noted by 
Mackenzie and Rogers, the Act appeals to a synchronic conception of capacity 
assessment as capacity is specific to a “material time”.35 This notion of time however 
is challenged as the person is to be considered through time in respect of retaining 
information,36 to be supported in making the decision with ‘all practicable steps”,37 to 
be evaluated in relation to the likelihood of having capacity at a later time,38 and to 
                                            
30 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(a). 
31 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(b) 
32 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(c) 
33 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(d) 
34 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(2). 
35 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2(1). 
36 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(b). 
37 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(3). 
38 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(3)(a) 
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have their past and present wishes considered in relation to best interests decision.39 
The feasibility of testing the four functional abilities in accordance with the MCA, which 
seemingly allows for a distinction between an incapacitous decision and a simply 
unwise decision, has received considerable scrutiny and outstanding questions 
remain as to how it is to be performed.40 The expectation that the assessor of capacity 
act with a degree of objectivity and to avoid preconceptions suggests either an 
unwillingness to acknowledge that capacity assessments might reflect the assessor’s 
values or that the person doing the judging is without perspective.41 At a more general 
level, the concern has been raised that “inherent tensions” exist between the MCA in 
law and theory and the assessment of capacity in practice.42 Manthorpe et al argue 
that for this tension to be overcome a more nuanced understanding of the Act to guide 
practice is required.43 A common feature of the difficulties confronting the 
implementation of the Act rather obviously is the role of the assessor. Difficulties in 
relation to how to see the patient, evaluate mental processes, act without bias and 
begin the capacity assessment need to be addressed if capacity assessment is to 
coherently enact the MCA.  
 
III.1 Situating Narrative Identity  
 
The adoption of a functional and diagnostic approach to capacity, coupled with 
insufficient guidance for the assessor, may be seen to leave little scope for applying a 
narrative identity approach to capacity assessment. Arguably the subjectivity or 
perspective of the assessor is avoided. The adoption of relational approaches to 
mental capacity in recent years, alongside the UNCRPD and associated claims for a 
social model of disability, challenge the traditional liberal conception of the self. The 
different uses of narrative identity in theorising mental capacity assessment offer both 
complementary and critical perspectives on the liberal/functional approach adopted in 
the MCA. 
 
In the first approach, narrative identity can be considered a resource for assessors of 
capacity as they seek to identify the wills and preferences of a person found to lack 
capacity. As Jeffrey Blustein notes, a “continuer view” can understand the role of 
others as extending the individual’s narrative identity where the individual’s ability to 
do so is lacking.44 For example, where a person is diagnosed with advanced dementia 
                                            
39 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(6)(a-b) 
40 J Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and what a patient values’ (2011) 25(6) Bioethics and 
T Thornton, ‘Capacity, Mental Mechanisms and Unwise Decisions’, (2011) 18(2) Philosophy, Psychiatry 
and Psychology 127-132. 
41 See M Donnelly, ‘Capacity Assessment under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Delivering on the 
Functional Approach?’ (2009) 29(3) Legal Studies 464-491; D Gibson, ‘Conceptual and Ethical 
Problems in the Mental Capacity Act 2005: An Interrogation of the Assessment Process’ (2015) 4 Laws 
229-244; M Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law, (Cornell 
University Press, New York 1990), 51; S Stefan, ‘Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist 
Theory, and Law’ (1993) 47 University of Miami Law Review 763-815, 780.  
42 K Hinsliff-Smith, R Feakes, G Whitworth, J Seymour, N Moghaddam, T Dening & K Fox ‘What we 
know about the application of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) in healthcare practice regarding decision-
making for frail and older people? A systematic literature review’ (2017) 2 Health and Social Care in the 
Community 295-308, 306. 
43 J Manthorpe, K Samsi, H Heath & N Charles ‘’Early days’: Knowledge and use of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 by care home managers and staff’ (2011) 3 Dementia 283-298. 
44 J Blustein, ‘Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story: The Problem of Personal Identity 
Revisited’, (1999) 27 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 20. 
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and found to lack capacity about where to live, the person’s narrative identity could be 
viewed as limiting of potential choices, such that whatever choice is made is consistent 
with the person’s wishes as previously expressed. While this approach may be 
intuitively appealing for those seeking to honour a person’s narrative identity, a range 
of issues need to be clarified, including the issue of whether wills and preferences or 
an individual’s life narrative should have priority, how an individual’s narrative is to be 
discerned, that is if there is only one, how to deal with conflicting narratives and finally 
how to choose between actions which all are consistent with an individual’s narrative 
identity.45 This narrative approach however does complement contemporary attempts 
to distinguish between mental capacity and legal capacity.46 An appreciation of a 
person’s narrative identity in cases of mental incapacity allows for their legal capacity 
to be preserved as it is their values and identity guiding decision making.   
A second approach is to view the capacity assessment process as the production of 
a narrative identity account, whereby the assessor is engaged in the co-construction 
of a patient’s narrative identity. Research drawing on this approach could seek to 
examine conventions and traditions informing how a patient’s narrative identity are 
articulated but also examine the reading that capacity assessors perform of a patient’s 
narratives. Carol Johnston and others draw attention to the role capacity assessors 
and judges play in determining what a patient’s narrative involves, which can then 
influence best interest decisions.47 This approach highlights how capacity assessors 
in asking certain questions and focusing on some issues over others, in effect, 
construct and/or limit the narrative identities of the person in question. The questions 
of assessors can be understood as having an editorial function.  
A third approach, as set out by Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, proposes that a 
definition of decision-making ability should include a narrative component.48 In 
rejection of an individualist conception of selfhood, Bach and Kerzner argue that the 
assessment of decision-making ability should be based on whether an individual has 
the capacity to express their wills and intentions to others, who can then recognise 
and ascribe agency to the individual’s actions, and secondly, the individual’s ability to 
answer who they are, articulate a life story, and for that narrative account, to “direct 
the decisions that give effect” to a person’s intentions.49 Here, the adoption of a 
relational approach to agency and selfhood recognises narrative identity as central to 
deciphering decision making ability or its lack, crucially though by locating the ability 
within an individual’s interaction with their community. Therein inability to make 
decisions is a feature of the individual and community, not the individual’s mind or 
brain.  
A fourth approach can view the capacity assessment process as a narrative practice 
in its own right. Therein it understands that the object of a capacity assessment is a 
45 M Kuczewski, ‘Narrative Views of Personal Identity and Substituted Judgement in Surrogate Decision 
Making’, (1999) 27 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 34-35.  
46 UNCRPD Article 12(2). For further discussion of legal capacity see A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the 
Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold for the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse 
Journal of International Law & Commerce 429.  
47 C Johnston, N Banner and A Fenwick, ‘Patient narrative: an ‘on-switch’ for evaluating best interests’, 
(2016) 38(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 249-262. 
48 M Bach and L Kerzner, ‘A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity’ 
Report to the Law Commission of Ontario, 2010.  
49 ibid, 65. 
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person’s narrative or their narrative identity, that the determination of best interests or 
a substituted judgement can seek to continue an individual’s engagement in narrative 
identity, and that the resultant judgement is an act of co-authoring of a narrative 
identity. Furthermore, capacity assessment practices are made possible by narrative 
identity and narrative selfhood and such practices are in fact a stage of critical 
readership of the individual. This work now turns to developing the fourth approach, 
where capacity assessment is understood as a distinctly narrative practice comprised 
of mimetic (Part III.2) and an identity negotiation (Part IV) dimension. 
 
III.2 A Mimetic Account of Mental Capacity Assessment 
 
The practice of capacity assessment can initially be read as corresponding to 
mimesis3, the stage of application, where a narrative is subjected to critical readership. 
A person’s decision or lack of a decision is read by the assessor of capacity and the 
action either rejected or accepted. This account of assessment as critical reading 
allows for four mimetic stages or periods of capacity assessment to be identified.  
 
Prior to any capacity assessment taking place however, there must already be two 
accepted narratives operative in the context. First, the assessor must have accepted 
and understood that the MCA is an appropriate symbolic, structural and temporal 
resource for categorising human action and secondly, there must be an accepted 
narrative which holds that a decision must be made.  The presence of these two 
resources, however, is insufficient to account for the commencement of a capacity 
assessment. The origin of any capacity assessment can be seen to emerge because 
of the narrative context, of which there are three types. Where an individual’s own 
account of what action is to be taken is the only proffered narrative, a capacity 
assessment will not be triggered. Where there is no account offered by the individual, 
as in cases of an unconscious patient, there is a narrative deficit. In such cases, there 
is an absence of a perspective to guide action and so a capacity assessment can be 
triggered. The third situation arises where in addition to a patient’s proposed account, 
there are also other accounts proposed, resulting in narrative conflict. Only where the 
alternative narrative is considered to have weight or relevance does narrative conflict 
precipitate an assessment. The instigation of a capacity assessment in cases, save in 
cases of narrative deficit, is contingent on the possessor of the alternative account of 
action believing that it should be relevant and in doing so questions the authority of 
the patient’s account. An example of narrative conflict would be if a patient maintains 
that she is unwilling to have life-saving heart surgery and yet her nurse’s narrative 
includes the patient’s commitment to being at her own daughter’s wedding in five 
years.   
 
The second stage of the process begins when, in the presence of narrative deficit or 
narrative conflict, the response of the assessor takes the form of a proposal of an 
alternative narrative, one which holds that the patient lacks capacity in respect of a 
decision. The acceptance of this incapacity narrative is dependent on the evaluation 
of the patient’s original account about the decision. In cases of narrative deficit, this 
activity often goes unnoticed, as the patient is found to not be able to communicate a 
decision, and by default the incapacity narrative is accepted. In cases of narrative 
conflict however, the patient’s engagement with the decision to be made is evaluated. 
The MCA requires that the basis on which someone can fail in this respect is where 
‘impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ contributes to an 
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inability to perform one or more of the tasks of understanding, retention, weighing and 
communication (URWC). A mimetic account allows for a reinterpretation of what is 
being assessed under the label of URWC as whether an individual’s narrative account 
demonstrates congruence with established narrative conventions and as such avoids 
an “error of fact” or “interpretive inaccuracies”.50 Where an individual is found to have 
performed URWC (a cognitivist approach) or avoided ‘errors of fact’ or ‘interpretive 
inaccuracies’ (a mimetic approach), then their narrative account will be accepted and 
the proposed incapacity narrative will be rejected. Where an individual is found to have 
failed to perform URWC (a cognitivist approach) or demonstrated ‘errors of fact’ or 
‘interpretive inaccuracies’ (a mimetic approach) then the proposed incapacity narrative 
will be endorsed.  
 
The third stage of the mimetic process commences after the endorsement of the 
incapacity narrative. This in turn beckons in the issue of what narrative account is to 
be supported in place of either the discredited narrative, or in cases of narrative deficit, 
an absent one. Assessors are thus confronted with the challenge of how to negotiate 
“substituted decision-making”, of which best interests and wills and preferences are 
available guiding principles.51 In such cases the assessor can legitimately be 
considered a co-author of the individual whose decisions are being considered, as 
they are charged with identifying which narrative account should guide the individual 
in the future. Alternatively the role of the assessor can be minimised and instead a 
‘continuer’ approach be endorsed. Therein the person’s narrative identity and/or wills 
and preferences guide the decision.  
 
The fourth stage or final stage can be identified where the best interests or substituted 
decision has been endorsed. The activity of critically reading an individual’s narrative 
is complete, and where the individual is found to lack capacity, an alternative account 
endorsed. The conclusion of the activity of critically reading the individuals narrative 
results in the activity taking on the status of mimesis1, as an established fact, which 
may have relevance in respect of future decisions.  
  
The reading of the mental capacity assessment process as a mimetic activity calls for 
a more nuanced understanding of capacity assessment and accordingly affords 
central importance to the role of the assessor. The adoption of a mimetic 
understanding of capacity assessment allows for greater recognition of those 
performing the assessment. The language and rhetoric of the MCA maintain that what 
lies at the heart of any determination is something ‘mental’, clarified in the Act as 
relating to ‘mind’ or ‘brain’, which contributes to a view that incapacity is a feature of a 
person, a functional inability. A mimetic account however allows for mental capacity to 
be identified as a concept which grounds a practice of critical readership. To claim that 
mental capacity is a relational term that corresponds to the relation between people 
and neither the assessor or assessed discretely, is arguably irrelevant. All forms of 
assessment by one person of another can be viewed as being relational in general 
and furthermore are liable to a narrative evaluation. The claim can however be made 
that what makes mental capacity practice, whether strictly in accordance with the MCA 
or not, an essentially narrative and relational practice, is the identification of three 
distinctly narrative features. First, mental capacity assessment, in cases of narrative 
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conflict, has as its object the person’s own decision and self-understanding which may 
become part of their narrative identity but crucially is a product of either the person’s 
implicit or explicit understanding of themselves. Second, the assessment of the 
person’s decision by the assessor is an act of critical readership, of the third stage of 
mimesis, in which the assessor is permitted to appraise the self-understanding of 
another. As acknowledged by both Ricoeur and Schechtman, narrative self-
constitution is an innately social activity. Third, the capacity assessment process 
requires the proposal of a narrative of incapacity by an assessor to instigate the 
process in the first place. What differentiates mental capacity assessment from some 
others forms of assessment is principally that it takes as its object an individual’s 
narrative selfhood, the performance of the assessment is an activity of narrative 
selfhood by the assessor, and the process requires an initial proffering of an alternative 
narrative for another.  The continued use of the term mental capacity however poses 
a problem for theorists seeking to acknowledge the mimetic dimensions of capacity 
assessment. This problem echoes the challenge faced by relational theorists 
challenging the traditional conception of autonomy in philosophical and legal 
discourse.52  
 
Practically, the mimetic reading invites consideration to turn to the initial period of 
concern leading to the commencement of a capacity assessment. Whereas the MCA 
in Sections 2-4 establishes a framework for assessing capacity and determining best 
interests in cases of incapacity, there is a failure to adequately explain when 
practitioners should assess capacity. This failure may stem from the historical context 
to which the MCA responds, in which it seeks to curtail or limit practices of interfering 
with and constraining the rights of persons. As such, the use of the MCA need not 
specify when the Act is to be applied, as there is a presumed set of persons to whom 
the Act relates. A further contributing factor to the failure to explain the impetus to 
doubt capacity can be traced to the limited space given to considering the role played 
by the assessor in the process. The mimetic interpretation invites readers to 
acknowledge that where neither an alternative narrative account nor an incapacity 
narrative is proposed, then an individual can never be found to lack capacity. As the 
MCA commits itself to a presumption of capacity, a decision on the part of an assessor 
is required before incapacity can be conferred. Accordingly, to adequately explain the 
assessment process, sufficient consideration needs to be given to the assessor’s role 
in instigating an assessment.  
 
The everyday use of the MCA places a considerable responsibility, albeit 
unacknowledged, on assessors to initiate the capacity assessment process. In one 
set of cases, those of narrative deficit (stage four of the functional model), the assessor 
is required to propose a narrative of incapacity. Although this activity is not of concern 
here, the issue of whether all cases of narrative deficit are responded to with capacity 
assessment is worthy of further research. In cases where an individual offers a 
narrative account of action, however, the issue of what provides the impetus for the 
assessor to doubt an individual’s capacity and subsequently propose a narrative of 
incapacity is unclear. Not all individuals with an impairment of the mind or brain have 
their decisions subject to a capacity assessment. Assessors of capacity are thus 
tasked, in cases of people who have articulated their own narrative accounts or 
decisions, to recognise alternative narrative accounts of action but also recognise 
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when in fact it is appropriate to privilege such an alternative account and thus trigger 
a capacity assessment. The failure within the MCA or Code of Practice to provide 
guidance on when alternative narratives are to be proposed might also stem from the 
historical context in which capacity assessment is considered to apply. An additional 
issue arising from this requirement to commence capacity assessment is the seeming 
expectation on the assessor to both know the person and be able to identify an 
alternative narrative relevant to that person, or to be familiar with appropriate 
alternative narratives to offer in certain cases or classes of people.  
 
The theorising of capacity assessment as a mimetic process also offers an alternative 
account of one of the cornerstones of the MCA. In accordance with the cognitivist 
model adopted, a judgement of incapacity is never considered global, binding on all 
the actions of an individual. Rather, it corresponds to a specific decision or issue and 
accordingly allows for accounts of simultaneous determinations of capacity and 
incapacity regarding different issues. The adoption of this decision specific approach 
contrasts with historical practices that deprived individuals of any right to partake in 
decision making based on status, a global determination.53 An alternative account of 
the move away from global determinations of incapacity is offered by a mimetic 
approach. As capacity assessments are cases of critical readership of an individual’s 
action, the assessment of some decisions and not others can simply be indicative of 
an assessor’s concern with some of an individual’s decisions, not all of them. The 
scope of capacity determinations such as those involving psychiatric inpatient 
treatment for a duration, financial matters, living arrangements and the relationships 
one can engage in, suggest while specific decisions might be considered, those 
decisions can have whole life or global impacts. Furthermore, as capacity 
determinations have the potential to impact on how individuals are understood and 
treated by others going forward, the impact of any capacity assessment can be 
considered greater than the decision in question. 
 
III.3 Narrative Incongruence and the Spectre of Paternalism 
 
The mimetic reading of capacity assessment allows for an understanding of the 
assessor’s role in conferring the status of incapacity to emerge. Whereas the MCA’s 
approach understands the assessor’s role as one of identifying incapacity by applying 
the two-stage test, a mimetic approach rejects the notion that incapacity necessarily 
involves an impairment of the mind or brain or a failure to perform a set of functional 
tasks. Lindemann’s theory of the interpersonal practice of ‘holding and letting go’ 
complements Ricoeur’s understanding of mimesis and provides a basis for mental 
capacity determinations to be considered from the perspective of the assessor.54 
Lindemann contends that personhood is conferred on an individual by others. Others, 
in having the power to recognise or reject aspects of one’s identity on a series of 
grounds, are engaged in a process of holding and letting go. Thus, the ability to 
perform an identity is regulated through a social act of critical readership.  
 
Lindemann sets out four grounds on which personhood is rejected. The first 
justification occurs in situations of “malfunctioning mental states”, whereby the 
individual can be considered incapable of maintaining a credible understanding of self 
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due to a cognitive deficit.55 This approach echoes the MCA’s understanding of 
incapacity as having its root cause in a cognitive impairment. The second basis on 
which an account can be rejected is “misleading expression”.56 In such cases the 
individual violates established social norms or accepted understanding. One form of 
this is “errors of fact”, whereby an individual is wrong about a socially accepted fact.57 
In proposing an understanding that is inaccurate, the individual demonstrates a failure 
to appreciate the world they inhabit. Here we can think of a person who maintains that 
the world is flat. Whereas some facts are seemingly non-negotiable, there are a range 
of beliefs about the world, such as religious convictions, where there is more flexibility. 
For example, a person’s belief in the existence or non-existence of god would not be 
deemed an error of fact. 
 
The second form of misleading expression occurs where an individual violates an 
“interpretive” norm.58 In such cases the individual might have an appreciation of the 
facts but their interpretation of those facts is considered inappropriate or unjustified. 
Here we can think of an individual who maintains that they are invincible and immortal 
having survived a deadly train crash. Other forms of interpretive error can involve the 
concealing of, or failure to disclose, issues related to oneself. An example of this can 
be seen where a doctor refuses to endorse a patient’s understanding of themselves 
as clumsy or prone to falls, on the suspicion that the patient has refused to disclose 
incidents of domestic violence. The idea of misleading expression poses a challenge 
to the model endorsed in the MCA, as it separates out the evaluation of a decision 
from a consideration of the functional abilities. The idea of misleading expression calls 
for contemplation of cases whereby an assessor might seek to classify the individual’s 
decision as incapacitous, where in fact the deficit is in their interpretation or 
understanding of facts alone. In accordance with the MCA such instances would not 
be grounds for a finding of incapacity. In accordance with Principle 2, assessors are 
required to provide all reasonable efforts to support an individual’s understanding and 
accordingly prevent a finding of incapacity on the basis of error of fact alone. 
Furthermore, Principle 3 prohibits the conferring of incapacity where there is an unwise 
decision, preventing a finding of incapacity based on interpretive inaccuracy alone. 
 
The third basis on which identity can be denied, that of “misfiring recognition”, occurs 
when there is a failing on the part of one person to recognise or acknowledge 
another.59 Cases of non-recognition can be informed by an interpretive inaccuracy or 
error of fact, whereby they prevent an acknowledgement of an another’s account or 
impose a particular account on the person. Practices of oppression can be considered 
failures to acknowledge the perspective of another, which result in a failure to accept 
or permit a person’s identity. The MCA can be considered to prohibit ‘misfiring 
recognition’ from guiding a capacity determination as principle 1 (section 1) requires 
that all individuals are presumed to have capacity until demonstrated otherwise and 
subsequently puts in place a framework for justifying a determination of incapacity, 
which relies on a concept of ‘malfunctioning mental states’.  
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The fourth form of identity denial, “misshapen response”, occurs when an oppressor 
refuses or denies a person of their very individuality and experience.60 Crucially this 
form of response involves recognition on one level, whereby the person is recognised 
by a particular status, whether it is woman, child, slave, teenager, disabled or refugee. 
Recognition however here serves to identify what form of response is appropriate or 
permitted. The form of response fails to acknowledge the experience or situation of 
the person and uses a category to justify practices. Lindemann proposes that 
misshapen response can take multiple forms from atrocities of “torture, enslavement, 
and rape”, practices of “segregation, lack of access to decent employment or 
education” to personal beliefs and attitudes towards particular groups of people.61 The 
MCA, as an alternative to a status based approach to capacity, shifts capacity 
assessment practice away from generalised responses based on the status of a 
person, to an approach that considers the person on a decision by decision basis.   
The MCA recognises a difference between denying narrative accounts on grounds of 
‘mental malfunctioning’, ‘misfiring expression and ‘narrative recognition’, permitting 
malfunctioning as the only basis for a finding of incapacity. The difficulty confronting 
the implementation of the MCA is whether this distinction is maintained. It is possible 
to imagine cases of misfiring expression where an individual fails in respect of URWC 
or commits an error of fact or interpretation, has an identified impairment of the mind 
or brain, but that the former is not caused by the latter. For example, a patient with a 
brain tumour (an impairment of brain) who refuses chemotherapy and is identified as 
failing the cognitive task of weighing up of information, might be found to lack capacity 
on the basis of the two-stage test. However, it may be the case that the brain tumour 
has no bearing on the decision which is in fact related to the witnessing of a loved one 
undergoing chemotherapy treatment and a wish not to experience something similar. 
To overcome such doubts, supporters of the MCA must demonstrate how an 
impairment of the mind or brain is directly linked to the task of URWC and how this 
causal nexus is to be observed.  
A further concern could be raised as to whether individuals found to fail URWC, but 
as such lacking the diagnostic requirement for a finding of incapacity, are subsequently 
submitted to examination and assessment to find an ‘impairment’ which would allow 
for a finding of incapacity.  The failure of supporters of the MCA to explain the 
relationship between mental activities of the mind and brain and subsequent decisions 
leaves open the possibility that determinations of ‘mental malfunctioning’ may in fact 
be ones of ‘misfiring expression’. A further difficulty might confront the MCA if the 
requirement for a cognitive impairment is removed and the basis for a finding of 
incapacity is simply the URWC test.62 Here the difficulty would involve the ability to 
distinguish between cases of misleading expression or misfiring recognition. Even 
without any changes to the MCA, it is possible to imagine situations where judges, 
nurses, doctors or carers, in positions of power by virtue of being able to commence 
a capacity assessment, label their own errors of fact, interpretive inaccuracies and 
failure to accommodate and support individuals, as cases of ‘misfiring expression’, 
when in practice they are cases of ‘misfiring recognition’. 
60 ibid, 115. 
61 ibid, 116. 
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One interpretation of the MCA holds that it responds to the fact that there is 
incapacitous and capacitous action and therein sets out means to distinguish between 
the two, which then recognises autonomous action, or calls for a substituted/supported 
decision making. An alternative approach could view the MCA as implicated in the act 
of categorising human action. Rather than being at a distance, it defines what is 
permissible action over others, and then labels this as soft paternalism. The MCA 
permits assessors to identify that a decision has to be made, question an individual’s 
capacity, perform the assessment of capacity and make a determination of best 
interests. Rather than simply identify what is capacitous or incapacitous action, it 
defines it, albeit somewhat unclearly.  If this secondary understanding is adopted, then 
we can view the MCA as not simply permitting soft paternalist practice, but also 
opening up the possibility of cases of hard paternalism in situations of malfunctioning 
mental states, misfiring expression or misfiring recognition. This is disguised in the 
Code of Practice as the distinction between capacity and incapacity is presented as a 
natural distinction, rather than a product of a liberal understanding of personhood.63  
 
IV. NEGOTIATING RELATIONALITY 
 
The activity of capacity assessment can also be considered in the context of the 
therapeutic relationship, specifically in regard to the ongoing identities of the individual 
and the assessors involved. The performance of a capacity assessment necessarily 
involves participants engaging in a form of identity negotiation, whereby questions of 
“who am I” and “what do I do” are considered.64  Although the mimetic reading of 
capacity assessment reveals the limits of narrative identity for the individual being 
assessed, the activity can also be considered a site where the assessor’s identity is 
itself negotiated. The result of a capacity assessment is not simply local and discrete 
to a particular event; rather the event can become pivotal for the individual and the 
assessor in how they make sense of their personal and/or professional identities.  
Where it is often recognised that capacity determinations are a site of balancing 
discourses of care and respect for autonomy, then a concern with how such 
determinations can impact on both individuals taking part seems justified.  
 
In cases of narrative conflict, the requirement placed on individuals to give an account 
of one’s actions, in having that account subject to scrutiny and experiencing the 
proposal of an incapacity narrative, demonstrates how the narrative identity of an 
individual can become subject to critical readership and limitation. Where an individual 
is found to lack capacity and an alternative narrative account is put forward to guide 
the decision in question, the capacity assessment process can be understood to 
establish mimesis1 conditions for the future in three respects. In a most basic sense, 
a determination of incapacity establishes a fact about that patient. While a 
determination of capacity can be act specific, the act itself might be one that occurs 
over a lengthy period of time but also the fact of the determination can become a 
resource or feature of the individual’s identity going forward and of those in the 
individual’s life. Secondly, the determination of incapacity or capacity serves to 
establish guidelines around what are symbolically appropriate or inappropriate ways 
to talk about conditions, decisions, risk, as well as personal justifications and beliefs. 
Thirdly, in a determination of incapacity with a prescribed action or inaction, the 
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individual is provided with the decision which may or may not be incorporated into their 
own understanding but also into the understanding of those around them going 
forward. Although the MCA sets an understanding of capacity as local, it should be 
acknowledged that determinations, the understanding of the process and the action 
or inaction prescribed, could have considerable global influence over the individual 
assessed. 
 
Turning to the assessor’s experience of capacity assessment, the implications for their 
own life are considerable. The assessor, in providing an alternative account of action, 
in proposing an incapacity narrative, in assessing the individual’s capacity and 
determining a best-interests decision, is expressing an understanding of their 
professional identity. These activities, specifically in cases that lead to narrative 
conflict, are not something they do, nor can do, in every interaction they have as 
professionals. The activity of capacity assessment can be seen to also establish 
mimesis1 conditions for the assessor. The performance of the assessment, as well as 
the relative success of the proposed incapacity narrative, can establish symbolic 
resources for the assessor to guide future capacity assessments. Secondly, the 
assessment of an individual can become part of the assessor’s own professional 
identity, a site whereby they can make sense of their professional responsibilities and 
reflect on the type of professional they are. Thirdly, a determination of incapacity can 
operate as a fact for the assessor in their understanding of the individual assessed 
going forward.  
 
V. A NARRATIVE THEORY OF CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
 
In drawing on the mimetic and identity negotiating dimensions of mental capacity 
assessment, a narrative theory of capacity assessment can be formulated. Such a 
theory however, is not supportive or critical of the practice of mental capacity 
assessment; rather it is a descriptive account of capacity assessment. The aim therein 
of a narrative theory is not to attempt to justify the practice of classifying an individual 
as lacking in capacity, but to interrogate what is happening in capacity assessment. 
Although a mimetic reading is possible in cases of narrative deficit, the adoption of a 
narrative approach is here confined to situations in which the individual articulates a 
narrative account of action. The three principles of a narrative theory of capacity 
assessment are: 
i) Mental Capacity determinations are judgements arising from and sometimes relating 
to an individual’s personal identity but always in a relational dynamic. 
 
ii) What is assessed in mental capacity determinations is the congruence between the 
narrative account of events or behaviours of the assessor and the assessed.  
 
iii) The impetus to assess capacity begins where alternative accounts that can lead to 
narrative conflict are shared with or identified by an assessor of capacity. * 
 
* Where capacity assessment is commenced at the request of a colleague or family 
member, the assessor may be considered not to instigate the process. Such an 
interpretation however is rejected. The mimetic precondition for capacity assessment 
is the acceptance of two narratives, the narrative of the MCA and the narrative that a 
decision needs to be made. Where the decision to commence a capacity assessment 
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is at the request of another, the person who makes the request can be considered 
through the lens of the first two mimetic stages set out above. The assessor who 
commences the assessment can be viewed as accepting the truth of narrative conflict 
or narrative deficit and the appropriate response of assessing capacity. The only 
difference from the original model is that the assessor here doesn’t observe or 
encounter narrative conflict or narrative deficit before deciding to assess. In accepting 
the recommendation of another and acting upon it, they instigate the assessment 
process. 
The interpretation of mental capacity assessment from a narrative approach to 
selfhood allowed for the identification of capacity assessment as comprised of a four-
stage mimetic process and as a site of narrative identity negotiation. Together, a 
reading of capacity assessment as mimesis and the negotiation of narrative identity 
inform a narrative theory of mental capacity assessment. Critically, this theory does 
not seek to endorse or justify the practice of conferring incapacity on persons but rather 
proposes a descriptive account of the phenomenon of mental capacity assessment. 
Accordingly, a narrative theory is not a guide for mental capacity practice nor a call for 
particular practice. The narrative reading developed here reveals that the cognitivist 
approach insufficiently addresses the first stage of capacity assessment, leaving 
assessors unclear as to when their duties to doubt capacity emerge. Furthermore, the 
failure to clarify the relation between a cognitive impairment in the mind or brain and 
an inability to perform a task of UWRC raises questions about the basis on which 
capacity determinations are made, whether individuals are labelled as lacking in 
capacity based on simply holding an alternative understanding, and challenges the 
language of capacity assessment which views capacity as something intrinsic or 
discrete to an individual.  
The narrative approach to selfhood developed here allows for mental capacity to be 
considered a relational term which is utilised in interactions in which people are 
sanctioned to offer alternative accounts of others’ lives and actions.  The question may 
be raised as to whether mental capacity and incapacity, as features or aspects of a 
broader processes of narrative selfhood, are in fact relationally constituted. The 
response however is not so simple. A narrative approach supports understanding 
determinations of mental incapacity as relationally constituted through a mimetic 
process. A narrative approach however does not deny that there can be impairments 
that underpin determinations of incapacity, but rather that a mechanism for 
distinguishing cases of mental malfunctioning from cases of misshapen response, 
misleading expression and misfiring recognition is lacking. Regardless of the basis for 
a determination of incapacity, the process is mimetic in nature. In regard to capacity, 
a narrative approach supports the claim that some aspects of capacity are relationally 
constituted. Where capacity requires the competencies to avoid committing errors of 
interpretation and factual errors, or violating the reality and articulation constraints, the 
acquisition of such competences can be identified as relationally constituted. The 
development of these skills emerges through the assistance of others, who through 
acts of critical reading, not just in relation to mental capacity assessment, but also less 
formally, guide individuals about acceptable ways of acting and developing self-
understanding. The narrative approach however does not deny that such 
competencies are dependent on functioning mental states. The narrative approach to 
mental capacity proposed here both calls for mental capacity and incapacity to be 
acknowledged as relationally constituted while also acknowledging aspects of both 
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are not so constituted. A narrative approach does not deny that individuals have and 
experience impairments. The narrative approach however challenges the confidence 
that mental capacity assessment is sufficiently developed to identify cases of mental 
malfunctioning and the claim that it simply evaluates decision making ability. 
 
The appeal to narrative identity in theorising mental capacity, however, can vary from 
approaches which view narrative identity as something one has or that they express 
to those which view narrative identity as something performed and negotiated with 
others. As such, the appeal to narrative approaches in mental capacity discourse must 
be scrutinised as to whether it understands the individual in terms of what they have 
or are on the one hand, or whether it acknowledges the activity of individuals alongside 
others and the role narrative can play in this.65  In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 
(1992), Lord Donaldson stated that the capacity of a decision is not directly related to 
the “rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent” reasons for making a 
choice.66 A narrative approach alters this understanding slightly. Mental capacity is not 
related to whether a decision is rational or irrational, but rather about the perceived 
rationality of a decision as considered from the perspective of an individual sanctioned 
to question the decisions of others, who in this performance negotiates both the 
identity of the individual assessed, as well as their own. 
 
A narrative approach to mental capacity assessment can be viewed then as both an 
alternative to but also complementary to the functional approach of the MCA. As an 
alternative, it challenges the inadequate consideration of the assessor’s 
responsibilities in the assessment process, suggests that capacity assessment may 
focus on something other than functional ability and proposes that capacity 
assessment involves identity negotiation. Although more complex than the MCA’s 
functional approach as it problematises the instigation of assessment, what is 
assessed and the notion that capacity assessment is decision specific, it highlights 
areas which need to be addressed if a ‘wider’ account of capacity assessment is to 
overcome tensions between theory and practice. In this latter sense, a narrative 
approach can be read as complementary as it identifies areas which need to be 
addressed within a functionalist approach to mental capacity.  
 
                                            
65 The call to acknowledge the role of narrative identity work through stories is not supporting the claim 
that narrative is the only means through which identity is negotiated. See A Woods, ‘Post-Narrative: An 
appeal’, (2011) 21(2) Narrative Inquiry 399. 
66 Re “T” [1992] EWCA Civ 18, para 37. 
